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Abstract
The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), a widely used method in experimental economics, clearly demonstrates that
motives other than pure monetary reward play a role in human economic decision making. In this study, we explore the
behaviour and physiological reactions of both responders and proposers in an ultimatum bargaining game using heart rate
variability (HRV), a small and nonintrusive technology that allows observation of both sides of an interaction in a normal
experimental economics laboratory environment. We find that low offers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both
the proposer and the responder; that is, both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.
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Introduction
I hesitate to say that men will ever have the means of
measuring directly the feelings of the human heart. A unit of
pleasure or of pain is difficult even to conceive; but it is the
amount of these feelings which is continually prompting us to
buying and selling, borrowing and lending, labouring and
resting, producing and consuming; … but, just as we
measure gravity by its effects in the motion of a pendulum, so
we may estimate the equality or inequality of feelings by the
decisions of the human mind.
William Stanley Jevons (1871), Introduction to The Theory
of Political Economy
Although laboratory experiments in economics are sometimes
criticised for straying too far from the field, they still offer the
comparative advantage of unlocking the ‘black boxes’ of human
decision making under strictly controlled conditions. One prom-
inent example is the ultimatum bargaining game (UBG) [1], which
clearly demonstrates the role of social, or other-regarding,
preferences in individual decisions. In addition to being used in
a large number of behavioural studies, the UBG has also been
employed in neuroeconomic investigations, which sometimes rely
on the highly demanding brain scanning technologies used in
neuroscientific research [2–4]. These technologies, however,
seriously constrain the experimental laboratory setting; in partic-
ular, by limiting the number of possible participants and restricting
social interactions between them. In this complementary study,
therefore, we strive to overcome such technological limitations by
employing the simpler physiological measure of heart rate
variability (HRV).
HRV, defined as a variation in the time interval between heart
beats, has been theoretically and empirically shown to indirectly
index regulated emotional responses (for a discussion, see [5]) by
registering a ‘cardiac signature’ or ‘theatre’ of emotions. This
ability, however, comes at the cost of having only an indirect
measure of neural processes. In addition, as an index of regulated
emotional responding, HRV is unable to capture the multifaceted
processes of emotions. Empirically, therefore, we are employing an
index of sympathovagal balance that serves as an indirect indicator
of mental or psychic stress. At the same time, the controlled
laboratory setting allows us to limit participants’ movements (e.g.,
standing up, walking around), thereby reducing as much as
possible any other physiological ‘noise’ that could interfere with
the effect under exploration.
Specifically, we run standard economic laboratory experiments
using heart rate monitors the size of a 2005 IPod (Figure S1 in File
S1), which, by recording a participant’s electrocardiogram (ECG)
with medical levels of accuracy, provide a measure of HRV.
Because cardiac automaticity is under the control of the
autonomic nervous system (ANS), this measure provides indirect
information about the subjects’ stress levels (emotional responses)
[6]. More explicitly, because the heart rate measures the body’s
physical reactions to stressors, its variability provides insights into
the ANS itself; most especially, the balance between sympathetic
(fight and flight) and vagal (rest and relax) activity [7]. HRV data
are also empirically linked to individual anxiety, emotional
personality, and the activity of several brain areas [8], meaning
that HRV provides insights into both mental activities and
emotions. Not surprisingly, therefore, the use of this measure in
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economics research is increasing, especially given the finding that
HRV is affected by payoff-relevant feedback [9–11].
Nevertheless, until recently neuroscience avoided exploring the
complex aspects of moral emotions or moral values, other than
providing systematic evidence on pride and embarassement from
cases of frontal lobe damage [12,13] and showing that violations of
moral norms can evoke moral revulsion or disgust [14]. In general,
brain scanning technologies help to identify moral and other
motives that drive human behaviour by indicating areas of the
brain that are activated during decision making [15]. Unfortu-
nately, however, brain scanning restricts the type of interactions
that can be studied – in particular, the interactive element in
standard economic experiments – thereby preventing simulta-
neous exploration of the behaviour of all parties involved.
For our study, we use a standard UBG in which two players are
instructed to share a certain amount of money. The first player –
the proposer – offers a way to split the amount, while the other
player – the responder – can choose to accept this split (giving both
participants the same amount) or reject this offer, in which case
neither player receives anything. We find that the modal and
median ultimatum offers are around 40–50 percent while the
means are between 30 and 40 percent. As in other studies [16],
offers below around 20 percent are rejected about 50 percent of
the time, while, offers in the range of 0 to 10 percent or above 50
percent are few.
Not only is the UBG one of the most heavily studied games in
experimental economics, it is also strongly tied to social
preferences [17–19] and the analysis of emotions in general.
Above all, as Handgraaf, Van Dijk and De Cremer aptly point
out, the game mirrors reality: ‘Ultimatums are everywhere. A
woman in the train who tells her child to turn down the volume of
a gameboy ‘‘or else…’’; a police officer who tells a drunk driver to
walk home if he wants to avoid his license being withdrawn – they
are all instances of ultimatums’ ([20] p. 263). In fact, ultimatum
games clearly model social-problem decisions, which ‘can be non-
stationary in a very specific sense: the value associated with one
agent’s action depends criticially on the changing actions (and
mental states) of other social agents’ ([21] p. 159).
This present study focuses on emotional determinants of
decision making in ultimatum situations, an issue often addressed
using interview or survey based research. Pillutla and Murnighan
[22], for example, use open-ended questions to examine purchase
negotiations, while Bosman, Sonnemans, and Zeelenberg [23]
survey ultimatum game responders on the intensity of each
element in a list of nine emotions. Both studies find a significant
negative relation between the offer and the intensity of negative
emotions, as well as a positive relation between the offer and the
intensity of positive emotions. They also discover that a
responder’s expectation of the offer is positively related to the
intensity of negative emotions, a finding that can be reconciled
with the results in the neuroeconomic literature [2]. In a study that
complements UBG-based neuroeconomic research, van ’t Wout et
al. [24] overcome the bulkiness of brain scanners by using skin
conductance; however, as in the neuroeconomic literature, their
focus on responder behaviour neglects the proposer.
We are in fact aware of only two studies [25–26] that explore
the emotional responses of proposers in a UBG. In the first,
Ketelaar and Au [25] use a repeated ultimatum game to elicit self-
reported feelings of guilt, asking participants to pair up with a class
colleague and adopt fixed proposer and reponder roles for two
rounds, the second of which takes place a week later. The study
results indicate that guilty reactions to selfish offers in the first
round increase the proportion of generous offers a week later. The
second analysis, by Nelissen et al. [26], links fear to the concern
that low offers might be rejected (risk of rejection) and sees guilt as
taking into account the concerns and interest of others. Nelissen et
al. measure anticipated fear based on the extent to which
participants felt ‘‘afraid’’, ‘‘worried’’ or ‘‘nervous’’ about their
offer being rejected if it were less, and guilt based on the extent to
which they felt ‘‘guilty’’ or ‘‘bad about what they did’’ or
‘‘regretted their decisions’’ ([26] p. 41). These authors induce guilt
by asking subjects to either report on a recent event in their lives
that made them feel guilty (treatment) or describe an ordinary
neutral event (control). Their results indicate that the treatment
group makes higher offers than the control group.
In line with this finding, in our study, the HRV measure
provides clear evidence that low offers in the UBG lead to high
levels of physiological arousal in responders and proposers. We
interpret the arousal as a sign of mental stress. Using our HRV
technique, therefore, allows us to combine behavioural evidence
with proposers’ physiological reactions when making unfair offers.
We provide a more detailed discussion of the current evidence on
HRV use in laboratory experiments exploring human interactions
in the next section prior to describing our experiment, reporting
the results, and outlining our conclusions.
HRV in Laboratory Experiments on Human
Interactions
The HRV measurement method records information on
activity in two major parts of the ANS, the sympathetic and
parasympathetic systems (for a discussion, see [27]). More
specifically, because the oscillations in heart rate generated by
these two branches of the ANS occur at different speeds or
frequencies [5], the timing difference can be used to identify the
extent of both activities. Activity in the sympathetic system is
reflected in the low frequency band (LF [0.033–0.15 Hz]) and that
in the parasympathetic system by high spectral power in the high
frequency band (HF [0.15–0.4 Hz]) (see also [28]). That is,
individuals react to mental stress with either increased sympathetic
and/or decreased parasympathetic activity [29]. Hence, the ratio
of activity in the low frequency band to that in the high frequency
band (i.e., the LF/HF ratio) can be used as an index of
sympathovagal balance [5], which serves as a useful indicator of
psychic stress. The LF/HF ratio is obtained by applying a
standard smoothed pseudo Wigner-Ville distribution (SPWVD)
transformation using the cubic interpolated heart rate signal
(5 Hz) and 512 frequency bins. Based on the context in which our
study takes place, we interpret the physiological arousal captured
by HRV as a measure of mental or psychic stress. We do not
provide insights into the exact physiological and psychological
mechanism; while the topic is worthy of further investigation, it is
outside the scope of this study.
Most important for our study is that HRV measures are a
valuable tool for understanding responses to social interactions or
human performance. Falk et al. [30], for instance, observe that
unfair pay is correlated with lower heart rate variability (higher
stress), while Dulleck et al. [8] show that in a UBG setting, stress
levels during a communication stage are correlated with the size of
the offer. Dulleck et al. [27] also use an HRV measure that
captures psychic costs from the contemplation of real or imagined
actions (tax evasion) to assess the psychic cost of breaking social
norms (tax compliance). Their results provide empirical evidence
of a positive correlation between tax compliance and psychic
stress, a finding consistent with empirical evidence that in a
situation of conflict between self-interest and group interest (social
dilemma), moral emotions help individuals solve the social
dilemma situation [31]. Brandts and Garofalo [32], on the other
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hand, report being unable to correlate HRV with success in the
resolution of a task, while Van Lange et al. [33] show that HRV
measures can seemingly influence the experimental outcome by
promoting behavioural trust in trust games and reciprocal giving
in the trustee. They point to interpersonal (touch and communi-
cations of care) and intrapersonal mechanisms (arousal and self-
awareness) as possible explanations for this finding.
Experimental Design
Our laboratory experiment was approved by the QUT
University Human Research Ethics Committee (UHREC,
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au). The study also involved written
informed consent by participants, a procedure approved by the
ethics committee. The experiment was conducted at the Queens-
land University of Technology over a three-week period in May
2008. The 156 voluntary participants were recruited primarily
from a first-year economics course using a faculty wide invitation
email and in-lecture advertisement. Those recruited were
informed that the experiment would include measurement of
their heart rate and that they would not be allowed to eat or drink
anything except water 90 minutes prior to the experimental
session. The entire study comprised a total of 13 sessions
conducted with six proposers and six responders. All sessions
were held in the afternoon to minimise the effect of daytime
variation in the heart rate, and none of the participants reported
previous experience with such an experiment in the follow-up
questionnaire.
The participants were randomly divided into two groups
(proposers and responders) and invited to different locations to
avoid potential biases from previous social interactions between
groups. After being welcomed to the experiment, they received
instructions about and assistance with applying the heart rate
monitors, which involved placing three single-use electrodes
connected to a Holter Medilog AR4 heart rate monitor on the
participant’s chest. The participants then had to climb two sets of
stairs to reach the computer lab, a controlled physical activity
designed to generate a baseline measurement for the individual
HRV components.
The computer-based experiment was programmed and con-
ducted using z-Tree [34]. Participants were presented with the
instructions for the ultimatum bargaining game on the screen as
they sat in front of the computer (Figure S2 in File S1) and also
heard the instructions read by a native English speaker. This
technique served two purposes: it ensured that all participants (1)
heard the instructions and (2) knew that the same rules applied to
all experimental subjects. Before the experiment began, partici-
pants also had to answer two control questions to check their
understanding of the instructions (see Figure S3 and S4 in File S1).
In our experiment, the UBG consists of nine rounds in which
each proposer is randomly matched with one responder in every
round (see Figure S5 in File S1 and Figure S6 in File S1). Each
proposer receives 360 cents (Australian $) to split with a responder,
who must then decide to accept or reject the suggested division; if
the offer is rejected, neither player receives payment. At the end of
each round, both participants receive a statement of all the
information on this round and their individual payoffs (see Figure
S7 in File S1). In 10 out of the 13 sessions conducted, the
participants received the aggregated payoff from all nine rounds as
well as a show-up fee of $5. In the remaining three sessions,
participants received a lump sum payment of $17 for participating
in the ultimatum bargaining part of the experiment. The UBG
itself is followed by a risk-aversion elicitation activity (see Figure S8
in File S1).
The experiment also includes a communication phase in which
proposers and responders meet to talk. Specifically, two proposers
are grouped together with two responders and given the chance to
talk freely without discussing the experiment. This communication
phase was implemented after the sixth round in 10 of the sessions
and at the end of the ninth round in the other 3 sessions. This
manipulation, which is designed to increase the feeling of closeness
with other participants, tests for an ad-hoc reference group.
The descriptive statistics for the experimental data are
summarised in Table 1, which lists the average offer in cents,
the average offer as a percentage, the acceptance rate, the average
accepted offer as a percentage, the average declined offer as a
percentage, and the gender and age distribution for various
subgroups. These subgroups are based on basic socio-demograph-
ic data and other control variables collected by questionnaire at
the end of the experiment. Overall, the findings are in line with the
results from other UBG-based research (e.g. [35]).
Data Analysis and Results
To analyse the participants’ behaviour, we look in detail at two
distinct events during the experiment: (1) the point in time at
which the proposer has locked in an offer and is awaiting the
responder’s decision and (2) the responder’s decision in reaction to
that offer. As key decision variables, we focus on the size of the
proposer’s offer (in % of total distributed payment) and the
responder’s decision to accept or reject (1 = accept, 0 = reject). Our
stress indicator, which is based on the smoothed pseudo Wigner-
Ville distribution (SPWVD) wavelet transformed time-frequency
distribution, is the ratio of integrated power in the low frequency
band (LF [0.033–0.15 Hz]) to that in the high frequency band (HF
[0.15–0.4 Hz]). We test the fit of our measure using an alternative
time-frequency distribution estimation method, but our results
remain largely robust. The resulting HRV measure is then
averaged over certain time intervals starting at the moment a
decision is registered in the experimental software. The data used
in this study are available on the webpage of the Queensland
Behavioural Economics Group.
Data Adjustments
Data adjustment is necessary because the time data of the events
in a computer-based experiment is prone to variation caused by
network traffic issues [34]. As a result, the time recorded gives only
an indication of when the event actually took place; that is, when
the information screen was in fact visible to the participant. The
network setup used in our experiment initially caused a delay of up
to three seconds, but we resolved this issue in subsequent
experiments by placing the lab computers on their own private
subnet detached from the university network [27]. We must also
assume a lag between the time a participant makes a decision and
the point at which the decision is entered into the computer. To
circumvent both problems, we allow for a variation of at least five
seconds in the time observation of any event. More specifically, in
identifying the strength of a potential effect, we use averaged data
over different time intervals – (0,10), (0,20), (0,30) and (0,40)
seconds after the time a participant was asked to make the decision
– in order to capture any reasonable time lag and/or inaccuracies
in the time recording.
Finally, we must account for individual differences in the
strength of the effect and the underlying signal. First, we address
participant heterogeneity by using an individual fixed effects
specification equivalent to a dummy variable for each individual.
Second, we use an innovative outlier detection routine – in the
spirit of Hendry and Krolzig’s [36] impulse-saturation method –
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which allows inclusion of additional individual characteristics
while still controlling for individual effects. The routine repeats the
analysis using randomly selected blocks of individual dummy
variables, retaining those that show a significant influence in
multiple repetitions. Thus, in addition to controlling for personal
characteristics such as gender, health status, or risk attitude, to
capture further individual effects, we also introduce the LF/HF
ratio recorded during the walking phase (climbing two sets of
stairs) at the beginning of the experiment to control for different
baseline levels in the signal.
Models and Estimation Tables
1. Proposer. To gauge the effect of the economic decision-
making process on mental stress levels, we first look at the reaction
of proposer i when tendering an offer in period t. To do so, we
estimate a model that postulates a linear relation between the level
of the stress indicator (LF/HF ratio) as dependent variable and the
size of the offer (as a percent of the total redistribution sum in each
round). This model includes control variables that account for
differences in the experimental setup (such as pre- or post-
communication phase or whether or not it was a paid session); a
time/period variable (number of previous rounds); and a subject
dummy to control for individual effects as independent variables.
In the specification without individual dummies, the control
variables also include individual characteristics like gender, health
(whether the participant takes any medication; 1= yes, 0
otherwise), and the baseline LF/HF ratio as measured during
the stair climbing phase. We also use different time intervals [t0,t1]
of means (10, 20, 30, 40 seconds) when measuring the level of the
stress indicator (LF/HF ratio) after the decision event in question.
Table 2, which reports our four estimations using the different
time intervals for the two techniques, shows a statistically
significant relation between the proposer’s offer and his or her
stress level. The sign of the coefficient is negative, which indicates
that making a higher offer (one more likely to be accepted) reduces
the level of stress (i.e., decreases sympathetic and/or increases
parasympathetic activity). Making a low offer, in contrast,
increases the proposer’s stress level. It is also clear that the
coefficient increases and decreases in size and significance over the
time interval shown, with the (0–20) second interval exhibiting the
strongest effect. It should be noted, however, that 12 out of the 78
recordings for the proposers (and 14 for the responders) were
discarded because of irregularities in the ECG recording, caused
mostly probably by dislocated electrodes. Nevertheless, as shown
in the supporting information (Table S1 in File S1), the behaviour
of the excluded participants does not differ from that of the rest of
the sample, lending validity to the data analysis without those
observations.
2. Responder. To examine the reaction of the responder, we
introduce into the model a dummy variable indicating acceptance
of the offer (A). Since a responder’s reaction depends on the size of
the offer received, the height of the offer (O) and the interaction
term (A6O) can also be included. The interaction term helps us to
identify the effect of the acceptance while controlling for different
levels of offers. For the responder, we estimate a linear relationship
between the level of the stress indicator (LF/HF ratio) as
dependent variable and the acceptance decision, the offer, the
cross effect of both and the control variables, a period variable,
and an individual effect dummy.
In Table 3, which reports the regression results using the same
time intervals as in Table 2, the variables of interest are again
highly statistically significant, the signs are in the expected
direction, and again the (0–20) second interval exhibits the
strongest impact. In fact, the result for this interval in the fixed
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effects specification clearly shows that the pure effect of accepting
an offer of zero share is positive (2.616–6.769*0= 2.616),
indicating that the acceptance of such an offer produces a
significant increase in stress level. On the other hand, the effect of
accepting an equal offer of a share of 50 percent of the total
amount to be divided (2.616–6.769*0.5=20.768) is slightly
negative, indicating that accepting a 50 percent offer somewhat
reduces the responder’s stress level. Rejecting a higher offer,
however, also induces stress, suggesting that the responder’s
enforcement of the norm carries psychic costs. Taking this
interpretation one step further, we can calculate the mean cut-
off value at which the acceptance of such an offer no longer causes
increased stress; namely, at (2.616–6.769*x=0Rx=0.386) or an
offer of around a 40 percent share of the amount to be divided.
Overall, the results reveal that both the proposer’s and
responder’s stress levels are affected by the decisions made during
the UBG. They also indicate that, on average, accepting offers that
deviate below the 40 percent level causes higher stress levels in
responders.
Extension
To extend the analysis, we look for evidence that these
physiological reactions also have behavioural consequences;
evidence that is hard to come by given that a fully self-aware
participant would anticipate the stressful experience and adapt his
or her behaviour accordingly. The fact that we can find residual
evidence for stressful events in the analysis above, however,
indicates that our participants were not fully able to anticipate and
incorporate their emotions. This observation thus raises the
question of whether the stress level associated with the decision in
the previous period (t21) affects behaviour in the current period.
Unfortunately, directly analysing this effect by relating the stress
level of the previous period to the behaviour in the current period
is not fruitful for either the level of the proposer’s offer or the
responder’s decision to accept or reject. That is, even apart from
the adaptation issues already mentioned, the statistical analysis is
further hindered by the lack of a proper control in the model for
individual heterogeneity in the HRV. As an alternative, we resort
to findings from a difference approach whereby the linear relation
is estimated using the change in the LF/HF ratio as dependent
variable and the change in offer size and control and independent
variables.
Here, the objective is to explore how the difference in the level
of offers made (DOi,(t-1,t)) by proposer i between the two periods t2
1 and t relates to the differences in the stress level (DHi,(t-1,t)) as
measured over a 20 second interval after the decision in both
periods. Our hypothesis is that participants can trade off a higher
stress level for a higher offer if it affects them negatively.
The results in Table 4 show that there is indeed a negative
relation between the difference in the offer and the difference in
the stress level. For these estimates, we report four different
specifications, one using a fixed effects model to account for
individual heterogeneity (1), and three that show results from a
standard OLS regression with added structural and individual
control variables (2–4). Although the impact of the additional
control variables is minimal, in the last specification, it is clear that
the overall validity of the model suffers.
These regression results, although they must be taken with a
grain of salt because of the model’s very low explained variance,
nevertheless preclude outright rejection of the hypothesis that
proposers mitigate their stressful experiences by raising their offers.
Unfortunately, however, the relatively large heterogeneity of
participants – even in the homogeneous student pool – does not
allow meaningful further examination, such as out-of-sample
predictions. Rather, additional research is needed to assess
whether such behaviour actually takes place or whether individ-
uals are in fact able to fully anticipate their emotional reactions. It
should also be noted that the manipulations employed in the
experiment are quite weak: the stakes for a single game round are
reasonably low and social identification with the opposite
participant is kept to a low level. Thus, further experiments
altering these variables could provide more reliable answers to this
question.
Conclusions
This study uses HRV technology to measure the physiological
reactions of participants in a standard economic bargaining
experiment. Because the HRV recording device is small and non-
intrusive, it allows us to retain the standard setup of an economic
experiment, including the interactions between several individuals.
The heart rate signal is decomposed using standard time-
frequency tools such as the SPWVD wavelet transformation,
which allows identification of the ANS activity in several frequency
bands related to the activity of different ANS subsystems. The
ratio of activity in the high frequency band to that in the low
frequency band signals the balance between the sympathetic and
parasympathetic systems, which is an indicator of mental stress.
We examine the effect of economic decision making on both
responders and proposers by conducting an ultimatum bargaining
experiment with first-year students at the Queensland University
of Technology.
Our results are strongly connected to recent findings in
neuroeconomic and neuroscience research, which uses brain-
scanning technology to relate activity in different areas of the brain
to specific behaviour. Such research shows not only that emotional
factors play a key role in determining participants’ behaviour in
the ultimatum bargaining game [2] but that the emotional
responses detected in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are
reflected in HRV measurements. Our HRV monitoring equip-
ment can thus indirectly record emotional signals in a far less
intrusive manner while also allowing an increased number of
experimental participants. Moreover, whereas most neuroeco-
nomics studies focus only on responder’s reactions, we are able to
explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of both
proposers and responders. However, as mentioned in the
introduction, HRV provides only an indirect measure of neural
processes and is only an index of regulated emotional responding,
unable to take fully into account and understand properly the
multifaceted processes of emotions.
The ability to examine the physiological reactions of proposers
and responders is a new development in neuroeconomics,
although economics has long recognised emotional reactions as a
strategy for fostering mutual reciprocity and reputation and
punishing uncooperative others [15,37]. Future studies might
therefore consider implementing a dual scanning technique in
which two brain scanners record the simultaneous neural
responses of two individuals intereacting in a bargaining exper-
iment [38]. The mental stress indicator in our method, however,
does allow identification of the post-decision stress levels of both
proposers and responders. We find that both the proposer and the
responder show stress responses to low offers, with responders
experiencing increased stress levels on accepting any offers below
40 percent. Assuming that the mechanism connecting mental
stress to physiological arousal is correctly identified, our method
may offer one possible way to measure the mental stress induced
by economic decision making, as well as allowing identification of
the stress component in reaction to changes in relative outcomes.
Heartbeat and Economic Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e108218
T
a
b
le
3
.
R
e
sp
o
n
d
e
r’
s
st
re
ss
le
ve
l
af
te
r
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
o
r
re
je
ct
io
n
.
F
E
O
L
S
(0
–
1
0
)
(0
–
2
0
)
(0
–
3
0
)
(0
–
4
0
)
(0
–
1
0
)
(0
–
2
0
)
(0
–
3
0
)
(0
–
4
0
)
A
cc
e
p
t
(A
)
1
.7
0
3
**
2
.6
1
6
**
*
2
.4
0
9
**
*
1
.8
1
9
**
1
.6
4
3
**
2
.4
5
**
*
2
.2
7
1
**
*
1
.8
9
8
**
(2
.0
5
)
(3
.0
8
)
(2
.8
4
)
(2
.3
1
)
(2
.1
1
)
(3
.0
7
)
(2
.8
5
)
(2
.5
8
)
O
ff
e
r
(O
)
4
.1
6
8
**
7
.3
1
2
**
*
6
.2
8
**
*
4
.2
1
1
**
4
.4
0
6
**
7
.5
3
2
**
*
6
.2
6
9
**
*
4
.5
0
7
**
*
(2
.3
0
)
(3
.9
4
)
(3
.3
8
)
(2
.4
5
)
(2
.5
4
)
(4
.2
2
)
(3
.5
4
)
(2
.7
5
)
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
(A
6
O
)
2
4
.1
2
9
**
2
6
.7
6
9
**
*
2
5
.9
4
8
**
*
2
4
.0
4
7
**
2
4
.3
3
**
2
6
.9
6
2
**
*
2
6
.0
5
5
**
*
2
4
.5
2
7
**
(2
1
.9
8
)
(2
3
.1
8
)
(2
2
.7
9
)
(2
2
.0
5
)
(2
2
.1
8
)
(2
3
.4
1
)
(2
2
.9
8
)
(2
2
.4
1
)
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
2
0
.6
5
5
2
0
.8
3
4
2
1
.1
6
5
*
2
1
.2
5
5
**
2
0
.9
0
8
*
2
0
.9
3
1
*
2
1
.2
4
6
**
2
1
.1
6
6
**
(2
1
.1
0
)
(2
1
.3
7
)
(2
1
.9
1
)
(2
2
.2
2
)
(2
1
.7
1
)
(2
1
.7
0
)
(2
2
.3
0
)
(2
2
.3
2
)
P
ai
d
se
ss
io
n
0
.9
6
2
**
2
0
.6
0
2
2
0
.3
3
9
2
0
.1
7
2
(2
.4
5
)
(2
1
.5
2
)
(2
0
.8
5
)
(2
0
.4
7
)
A
g
e
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
1
9
0
.0
2
9
(0
.9
5
)
(1
.3
9
)
(0
.5
2
)
(0
.8
3
)
G
e
n
d
e
r
(f
e
m
al
e
)
2
0
.6
5
5
**
2
2
.0
4
**
*
2
1
.1
7
7
**
*
2
1
.4
3
5
**
*
(2
2
.1
7
)
(2
6
.3
0
)
(2
3
.7
6
)
(2
4
.5
9
)
H
e
al
th
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
B
as
e
lin
e
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
P
ER
IO
D
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
IN
D
IV
ID
U
A
L
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
R
2
0
.0
4
0
.0
9
0
.1
3
0
.1
5
0
.3
3
0
.3
6
0
.4
0
0
.4
5
F
1
.8
4
8
3
.9
9
4
6
.1
1
9
7
.4
7
4
7
.5
0
8
.1
4
9
.7
6
5
1
1
.0
2
5
P
r(
F.
f 0
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
N
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
5
8
5
N
o
te
s:
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
av
e
ra
g
e
LF
/H
F
ra
ti
o
o
ve
r
1
0
,
2
0
,
3
0
an
d
4
0
se
co
n
d
s
af
te
r
th
e
su
b
je
ct
p
u
ts
fo
rw
ar
d
th
e
o
ff
e
r.
Si
g
n
if
ic
an
ce
le
ve
ls
:
*
=
0
.0
5
,
P
,
0
.1
0
,
**
=
0
.0
1
,
P
,
0
.0
5
an
d
**
*
=
P
,
0
.0
1
.
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
in
p
ar
e
n
th
e
se
s.
d
o
i:1
0
.1
3
7
1
/j
o
u
rn
al
.p
o
n
e
.0
1
0
8
2
1
8
.t
0
0
3
Heartbeat and Economic Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e108218
Nevertheless, although these initial results point to a correlation
between decision making and physiological reaction, we find only
weak evidence that mitigation of stressful experiences by
behavioural adaptation occurs even in the artificial computer lab
environment, which raises the question of effect direction. That is,
do emotions dictate behaviour or does behaviour induce
emotional response? Although our results can give no definite
answer to this question, our second set of results clearly indicates
some sort of link between the emotional state and the decision.
Admittedly, it may be extremely difficult to distinguish the mental
processes that determine behaviour from those associated with
emotions. Nevertheless, HRV technology is very well-suited to
further exploring these issues because the manipulations required,
such as establishing stronger social ties between the participants,
demand greater flexibility in the experimental setup than other
physiological measurement methods can currently provide.
One recent development in neuroscience is an effort to
differentiate between positive and negative emotions, particularly
as they concern the (ventral) striatum, which is strongly linked to
reward, and the amygdala, which is strongly associated with
negative emotional processes [39]. For example, Tabibnia,
Satpute, and Lieberman [40] find that the ventral striatum,
amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), and a midbrain region near the substantia nigra
show greater activity during high fairness offers than during low
fairness offers, indicating that individuals react to positive
experiences (fairness). This finding raises the question of whether
fair offers induce positive emotional responses. According
Tabibnia and Lieberman [39], fair offers are linked to higher
self-reported happiness and increased activity in various reward
regions of the brain. Future studies using non-intrusive methods
could thus provide new insights into fairness, happiness, and stress.
Another promising avenue for future research is to increase the
possible set of actions to be more consistent with real world
experiences. For example, whereas the responders in our
experiment expressed their anger and emotions through punish-
ment (rejection), Xiao and Houser [41] introduce an alternative
and less expensive emotional outlet – the chance to write a
message to the proposer at no pecuniary cost. They find that
responders are less likely to use punishment via rejection of unfair
offers when they can use this medium to express negative emotions
towards the proposer. It is also possible that in addition to
experiencing stress when putting forward unfair offers, some
proposers may experience pleasure when making fair offers. For
instance, after asking questions designed to generate emotional
proxies, Haselhuhn and Mellers [42] report that 10 percent of
their proposers experienced greater pleasure from fair payoffs than
from larger payoffs, an issue that warrants further study using
neuroscientific tools. It would also be interesting to determine
whether loyalty or positive feedback is linked to emotions.
Whatever the goal, the ECG recorder, as well as similarly non-
intrusive tools, provides researchers with a valuable opportunity to
explore multiple subjects engaged in multiple social interactions, a
setting that better approximates real life situations [43].
Supporting Information
File S1 This file contains Figure S1-Figure S8 and Table
S1. Figure S1. Holter Medilog Digital ECG Recorder AR4.
Figure S2. Instruction Screen for the Ultimatum Bargaining
Game. Figure S3. Ultimatum Bargaining Game Test Questions.
Figure S4. Ultimatum Bargaining Game Failure to Complete Test
Questions. Figure S5. Ultimatum Bargaining Game Offer Screen
(Proposer). Figure S6. Ultimatum Bargaining Game Acceptance
Screen (Responder). Figure S7. Ultimatum Bargaining Game
Summary Screen. Figure S8. Risk Attitudes Elicitation Screen.
Table S1. Summary of the Excluded Data.
(DOCX)
Table 4. Proposer’s stress level (differences approach).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(FE) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)
Diff. Offer (DO) 22.737*** 22.768*** 22.681*** 22.684***
(22.92) (23.16) (23.07) (23.06)
Communication 20.336 20.331
(20.62) (20.61)
Paid session 0.239 0.228
(0.70) (0.66)
Age 20.008
(20.24)
Gender (female) 0.022
(0.07)
PERIOD Yes No Yes Yes
INDIVIDUAL Yes No No No
R2 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05
F 2.691*** 9.975*** 2.544*** 2.117**
Pr(F.f0) 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.015
N 528 528 528 528
Notes: Dependent variable: difference in the level of the participant’s mental stress between the previous and current period. Significance levels: * = 0.05,P,0.10,
** = 0.01,P,0.05 and *** = P,0.01. t-statistics in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108218.t004
Heartbeat and Economic Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e108218
Acknowledgments
We thank two anonymous reviewers and the Academic Editor for very
helpful comments.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: UD BT MS. Performed the
experiments: UD BT MS. Analyzed the data: UD BT MS. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: UD BT MS. Wrote the paper: UD BT
MS. Programmed the experiment using Z-Tree, an experimental
economics software: MS.
References
1. Gu¨th W, Schmittberger R, Schwarze B (1982) An experimental analysis of
ultimatum bargaining. J Econ Behav Organ 3: 367–388.
2. Sanfey AG, Rilling JK, Aronson JA, Nystrom LE, Cohen JD (2003) The neural
basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science 300: 1755–
1758.
3. Glimcher PW, Rustichini A (2004) Neuroeconomics: the consilience of brain and
decision. Science 306: 447–452.
4. Zak PJ (2004) Neuroeconomics. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 359:
1737–1748.
5. Appelhans BM, Luecken LJ (2006) Heart rate variability as an index of regulated
emotional responding. Rev Gen Psychol 10: 229–240.
6. Levy MN (1994) Vagal Control of the Heart: Experimental Basis and Clinical
Implications. Armonk, NY: Futura Publishing.
7. Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology the North American Society
of Pacing Electrophysiology (1996) Heart rate variability: standards of
measurement, physiological interpretation, clinical use. Circulation 93: 1043–
1065.
8. Dulleck U, Ristl A, Schaffner M, Torgler B (2011) Heart rate variability, the
autonomous nervous system, neuroeconomic experiments. J Neurosci Psychol
Econ 4: 117–124.
9. Crone EA, Somsen RJ, van Beek B, van der Molen MW (2004) Heart rate and
skin conductance analysis of antecendents and consequences of decision making.
Psychophysiology 41: 531–540.
10. Crone EA, Bunge SA, de Klerk P, van der Molen MW (2005) Cardiac
concomitants of performance monitoring: context dependence and individual
differences. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 23: 93–106.
11. Koelsch S, Remppis A, Sammler D, Jentschke S, Mietchen D, et al. (2007) A
cardiac signature of emotionality. Eur J Neurosci 26: 3328–3338
12. Damasio AR (1994) Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, the Human Brain. New
York: Avon Books.
13. Moll J, Zahn R, de Oliveira-Souza R, Krueger F, Grafman J (2005) The neural
basis of human moral cognition. Nat Rev Neurosci 6: 799–809.
14. Chapman HA, Kim DA, Susskind JM, Anderson AK (2009) In bad taste:
evidence for the oral origins of moral disgust. Science 323: 1222–1226.
15. Sanfey AG (2007) Social decision-making: insights from game theory and
neuroscience. Science 318: 598–602.
16. Camerer CF (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic
Interaction. New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
17. Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, cooperation.
Q J Econ 114: 817–868.
18. Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC: AA theory of equity, reciprocity,
competition. Am Econ Rev 90: 166–193.
19. Engelmann D, Strobel M (2004) Inequality aversion, efficiency, maximin
preferences in simple distribution experiments. Am Econ Rev 94: 857–869.
20. Handgraaf MJJ, Van Dijk E, De Cremer D (2003) Social utility in ultimatum
bargaining. Soc Justice Res 16: 263–283.
21. Rilling JK, King-Casas B, Sanfey AG (2008) The neurobiology of social
decision-making. Curr Opin Neurobiol 18: 159–165.
22. Pillutla MM, Murnighan KJ (1996) Unfairness, anger, spite: emotional rejections
of ultimatum offers. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 68: 208–224.
23. Bosman R, Sonnemans J, Zeelenberg M (2001) Emotions, rejections, cooling off
in the ultimatum game. Unpublished manuscript, CREED.
24. Van ’t Wout M, Kahn RS, Sanfey AG, Aleman A (2006) Affective state and
decision-making in the ultimatum game. Exp Brain Res 169: 564–568.
25. Ketelaar T, Au WT (2003) The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of
uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: an affect-as-
information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. Cogn
Emot 17: 429–453.
26. Nelissen RMA, Leliveld MC, Van Dijk E, Zeelenberg M (2011) Fear and guilt in
proposers: using emotions to explain offers in ultimatum bargaining. Eur J Soc
Psychol 41: 78–85.
27. Dulleck U, Fooken J, Newton C, Ristl A, Schaffner M, et al. (2012) Tax
compliance and psychic costs: behavioral experimental evidence using a
physiological marker, CREMA Working Paper No. 2012–19, Center for
Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
28. Malik M (2008) Standard measurement of heart rate variability. In: Camm JA,
Malik M, editors, Dynamic Electrocardiography. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons.
29. Berntson GG, Cacioppo JT, Binkley PF, Uchino BN, Quigley KS, et al. (1994)
Autonomic cardiac control. III. Psychological stress and cardiac response in
autonomic space as revealed by pharmacological blockades. Psychophysiology
31: 599–608.
30. Falk A, Menrath I, Verde PE, Siegrist J (2011) Cardiovascular consequences of
unfair pay. IZA Discussion Paper No.5720.
31. De Hooge IE, Zeelenberg M, Breugelmans SM (2007) Moral sentiments and
cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt. Cogn Emot 21: 1025–
1042.
32. Brandts J, Garofalo O (2012) Gender pairings and accountability effects. J Econ
Behav Organ 83: 31–41.
33. Van Lange PAM, Finkenauer C, Popma A, van Vugt M (2011) Electrodes as
social glue: measuring heart rate promotes giving in the trust game.
Int J Psychophysiol 80: 246–250.
34. Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic
experiments. Exper Econ 10: 171–178.
35. Roth A (1995) Bargaining experiments. In: Kagel J, Roth A, editors, Handbook
of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
36. Hendry DF, Krolzig H (2005) The properties of automatic GETS modelling.
Econ J 155: C32–C61.
37. Nowak MA, Page KM, Sigmund K (2000) Fairness versus reason in the
ultimatum game. Science 289: 1773–1775.
38. Blakemore S-J, Winston J, Frith U (2004) Social cognitive neuroscience: Where
are we heading?. Trends Cogn Sci 8: 216–222.
39. Tabibnia G, Lieberman MD (2007) Fairness and cooperation are rewarding:
evidence frorm social cognitive neuroscience. Ann N Y Acad Sci 1118: 90–118.
40. Tabibnia G, Satpute AB, Lieberman MD (2008) The sunny side of fairness:
preference for fairness activates reward circuitry (and disregarding unfairness
activates self-control circuitry). Psychol Sci 19: 339–347.
41. Xiao E, Houser E (2005) Emotion expression in human punishment behavior.
PNAS 102: 7398–7401.
42. Haselhuhn MP, Mellers BA (2005) Emotions and cooperation in economic
games. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 23: 24–33.
43. Adolphs R (2003) Cognitive neuroscienceof human social behavior. Nat Rev
Neurosci 4: 165–178.
Heartbeat and Economic Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e108218
